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ROBERT B. TITUS· 
One of the most topical issues among both corporate practitioners 
and state legislators during these past three years has concerned the 
desirability of amending state corporation statutes to enable limita­
tions on corporate directors' liability for breach of the duty of care. 1 
• Yale University, B.A. 1962, LL.B 1968; Professor of Law, Western New England 
College School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of 
Donna Case-~ossato in the preparation of this article. 
I. The extent of the interest is evident from the large number of articles and com­
mentaries which have appeared. See, e.g., Block, Barton & Garfield, Advising Directors on 
the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 130 (1986); Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, 
Responses to the D&O Insurance Crisis, 19 REv. SEC. & CoMM. REG. 263 (December 24, 
1986) [hereinafter Veasey I]; Hanks, State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability 
Crisis, 20 REv. OF SEC. & COMM. REG. 23 (February II, 1987) [hereinafter Hanks, State 
Legislative Responses]; Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a 
Three Legged Stool ofLimited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 
(1987) [hereinafter Veasey II]; Comment, Director Liability: Michigan's Response to Smith 
v. Van Gorkom, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1039 (1987); Linsley, Statutory Limitations on Direc­
tors' Liability in Delaware, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 529 (1987); King, Director Protection 
Under Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 129 (August, 1987); Hazen, Corporate 
Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REV. 171 
(1987); Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors Liability: Delaware's Section 102 (b)(7) and the 
Erosion of the Directors' Duty ofCare, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239 (1987); Note, The Limita­
tion ofDirectors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1987) 
[hereinafter Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability]; Note, Corporate Directors-An 
Endangered Species?, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 497; Note, Statutory Responses to Boordroom 
Fears, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 749 [hereinafter Note, Statutory Responses]; Note, Stat­
1 
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Twenty-five or more states have effected some change to their respec­
tive state corporation laws in this respect;2 many others have consid­
ered, or will be considering, similar amendments. 3 These legislative 
initiatives have been triggered principally by concern that corporations 
were finding it difficult to attract and retain qualified directors and 
because directors were exposed, with respect to transactions where one 
or more shareholders might contend that the directors failed to exer­
cise due care, to potential personal liability both disproportionately 
large and rather unpredictable. While the enacted and proposed 
amendments include a variety of elements, including provisions re­
garding both the appropriate standard of conduct for directors4 and 
utory and Non-Statutory Responses to the Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis, 63 
IND. L.J. 181 (1987-88) [hereinafter Note, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses]; Gelb, 
Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment o/the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 13 (1988); 
Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and 
Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988). 
2. Several states have amended their stock corporation laws to provide for the elimi­
nation or limitation upon the liability of directors for breach of duty'of care. ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-004 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 
1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3) 
(Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17­
6002 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24C(4) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1.5) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. §§ 450.2209, 450.2541 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.l11(4), 
302A.251(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 
1986); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.037(1) (Michie Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2­
7(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-4-18.2 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. 
CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11)(Supp. 1988); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(0) (Anderson Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 1006(7) (West Supp. 1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8364 (purdon Supp. 1988); 
R.1. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(6) (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 
(Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-7-3.1 (1988); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.307 (West Supp. 1987); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 17-1-202(c) (Michie 1987). 
3. Among the other states which have considered or may be considering some fur­
ther revision of their corporation laws are Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, 
Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington. A list of the various bills intro­
duced in the 1987 sessions of the legislatures in these states is on file in the office of the 
Western New England Law Review. 
4. Some states have specified in their corporation laws an expanded list of factors 
which shall be considered by the Board of Directors in adopting or rejecting a particular 
corporate action. Thus, for example, the Connecticut Stock Corporation Act now provides 
as follows: 
For purposes of [the sections relating to corporate combinations or acquisitions], 
a director of a corporation which has a class of voting stock registered pursuant 
to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as the same has been or 
hereafter may be amended from time to time, in addition to complying with the 
provisions of [Section 33-313(d)], shall consider, in determining what he reason­
ably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as 
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the circumstances under which indemnification by the corporation 
may be permitted,S the central feature often has been a statutory pro­
vision enabling either a limitation on, or the elimination of, corporate 
directors' liability for breach of the duty of care. It is these specific 
legislative responses which are the principal focus of this commentary. 
The analysis which follows includes five parts: first, a review of the 
three principal statutory alternatives which have been enacted with 
respect to limitation of directors' liability; second, the alternative ap­
well as the short-tenn interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the share­
holders, long-tenn as well as short-tenn, including the possibility that those inter­
ests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation, (3) the 
interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and 
(4) community and societal considerations including those of any community in 
which any office or other facility of the corporation is located. A director may 
also in his discretion consider any other factors he reasonably considers appropri­
ate in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation. A person who perfonns his duties in accordance with this subsec­
tion shall be deemed to have no liability by reason of being or having been a 
director of the corporation. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (1988), as amended by 1988 Conn. Acts 350 (Reg. 
Sess.). It is somewhat unclear just what legal effect was intended by this specification of 
factors to be considered. On one hand, the revision notes that factors other than the inter­
ests of shareholders, i.e. employees, customers, creditors, local community, shall be taken 
into account in detennining what is in the best interests of the corporation. In addition, the 
last sentence states that a person who "perfonns his duties in accordance with this subsec­
tion shall be deemed to have no liability ...." Id. Yet, a director presumably still has to 
show care and prudence in evaluating these considerations. Connecticut's approach fur­
ther is novel in that the enumerated standards apparently apply only to publicly-held com­
panies whose securities are registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. No 
provision is made for the standards to be considered by directors of smaller, closely-held 
corporations. For a thoughtful criticism of statutory standards which includes considera­
tion of the interests of persons or groups other than shareholders, see Gilson, A Structural 
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. 
L. REV. 819, 848-65 (1981). 
For examples of similar statutes, several of which expressly eliminate any liability on 
the part of directors absent recklessness or gross negligence, see FLA. STAT. § 607.1645 
(West Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(0) (Anderson SUpp. 
1987); PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1988); and WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 180.307 (West SUpp. 1987). 
In general, these statutes apply only to individuals acting in the capacity of director, 
and not to other corporation officials. 
5. Several states have expanded the right of domestic corporations to indemnify di­
rectors, officers, and other corporate agents. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8 (West 
Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. 
CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19(a) (Supp. 1987); 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8365(a) (Purdon SUpp. 1988); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 
2.02-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(a) (1988). For a good discussion of 
the role and significance of expanded indemnification provisions, see Note, Statutory Re­
sponses to Boardroom Fears, supra note 1, at 761-62. 
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proach proposed by the ALI's Corporate Governance Project;6 third, 
a discussion of the various arguments in support of some action to 
limit or eliminate directors' liability; fourth, a consideration of some of 
the problems or concerns which have been raised regarding these new 
statutory alternatives; and finally, a concluding recommendation re­
garding this observer's preferred course of action. 
I. PRINCIPAL STATUTORY ApPROACHES BEING UTILIZED 
Three distinct statutory patterns addressing the problem of direc­
tors' liability have emerged. The predominant approach (which, for 
purposes of this article, we will refer to as the "Delaware approach") 
has been amendment of the state corporation law to authorize a corpo­
ration to adopt a specific amendment to its certificate of incorporation 
to limit or eliminate directors' liability.' Under this approach, a cor­
poration simply is authorized to amend its certificate of incorporation 
6. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 7.17 at 25-26 (Tent. Draft No.7, April 10, 1987) [hereinafter Corporate Governance 
Project, T.D. 7]. 
7. Section 102(b)(7) of title 8 of the Delaware Code provides as follows: 
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of 
incorporation . . . the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of 
the following matters: 
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a direc­
tor to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate 
or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of 
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in 
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of 
law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the 
director derived an improper personal benefit .... 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2­
171(b)(3) (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002 (Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
156B, § 13(b)(1.5) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§§ 450.2209, 450.2541 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.1I1(4), 
302A.251(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.037 (Michie Supp. 
1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:-2-7(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53­
4-18.2 (Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 
42, § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (1988); TEX. REV. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-7-3.1 
(1988). 
It may be noted that under the Delaware approach, the limitation or elimination of 
personal liability applies only to a breach of the duty of care. A director still may be liable 
for money damages regarding any breach of the duty of loyalty, e.g., with respect to corpo­
rate transactions in which the director may have a material personal interest. While the 
scope and significance of this exception is not considered further in this article, one can 
refer to various other commentators for discussions of that subject. See, e.g., Linsley, 
supra note I, at 535-68; Lee, supra note I, at 273; and Gelb, supra note 1, at 38-43. 
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in the conventional manner-i.e., upon approval of both the board of 
directors and the shareholders-to achieve the desired result. 8 
A second approach, adopted to date by a much smaller number of 
states (hereinafter the "Indiana approach"), is to amend the applicable 
corporation law flatly to provide that, absent willful misconduct or 
recklessness, corporate directors have no liability for any breach of a 
duty of care.9 In this instance, the limitation or elimination of liability 
is automatically effective upon the enactment of the statutory change 
without the necessity for any action by individual corporations or their 
shareholders. 
The third approach is that being pursued by Virginia-namely, to 
specify a statutory cap on the maximum liability to which directors 
(and officers) may be subject. IO Under the Virginia corporation law 
amendments, a corporate official's maximum liability generally is the 
greater of: (1) $100,000.00 or (2) the amount of cash compensation 
received by the officer or director from the corporation during the 
8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986) and other statutes 
referenced supra note 7. 
9. The Indiana approach operates in mandatory fashion to relieve directors of liabil­
ity, absent willful misconduct, as follows: 
A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take 
any action, unless: 
(1) the director has breached or failed to perform the duties of the direc­
tor's office in compliance with this section; and 
(2) the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or 
recklessness. 
IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1988). 
A variation on this approach is that followed by Connecticut where a director is' 
deemed not liable ifhe or she considers the various standards set out in the revised corpora­
tion law. See supra note 4 and discussion therein as to the effect of such language. 
10. The charter options open to Virginia corporations are as follows: 
A. In any proceeding brought by or in the right of a corporation or brought by 
or on behalf of shareholders of the corporation, the damages assessed against an 
officer or director arising out of a single transaction, occurrence or course of con­
duct shall not exceed the lesser of: 
1. The monetary amount ... specified in the articles of incorporation or, if 
approved by the shareholders, in the bylaws as a limitation on ... the liability of 
the officer or director; or 
2. The greater of (i) $100,000 or (ii) the amount of cash compensation re­
ceived by the officer or director from the corporation during the twelve months 
immediately preceding the act or omission for which liability was imposed. 
B. The liability of an officer or director shall not be limited as provided in this 
section if the officer or director engaged in willful misconduct or a knowing viola­
tion of the criminal law or of any federal or state securities law, including, with­
out limitation, any claim of unlawful insider trading or manipulation of the 
market for any security. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988). For a further discussion of these provisions, 
see King, supra note 1, at 129. 
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twelve months immediately preceding the act or omission for which 
liability is imposed. I I This cap is effective as to Virginia corporations 
without any further action by either a corporation's board of directors 
or shareholders (although the amount of the cap can be reduced, but 
not increased, by appropriate amendment of the corporation's charter 
documents). 
Each of these alternatives typically is proposed together with var­
ious other corporation law revisions. Thus, a state interested in taking 
action to protect directors not only might modify its corporation law 
to permit a corporation to adopt the requisite amendment to its certifi­
cate of incorporation limiting liability, but also might adopt provisions 
which will broaden the scope of permissible indemnification or set 
forth a wider range of standards and interests which the directors 
properly may consider in taking action.12 
The practical effect of all three of these approaches generally has 
been to eliminate accountability by corporate directors for any mone­
tary liability for breach of the duty of care. The Indiana approach 
achieves this result directly, by amending the corporation law to bar 
any director liability absent willful misconduct or recklessness. The 
Delaware and Virginia statutory approaches theoretically leave room 
for corporations to adopt amendments to their certificates of incorpo­
ration providing a cap on the maximum liability of corporate officials, 
thus retaining a minimal level of residual financial exposure for those 
officials. However, most corporations which have put forth an amend­
ment for shareholder consideration have proposed total elimination of 
financial liability. 13 
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988). For text of this provision, see supra 
note 10. The effect of the statutory provision is to cap outside directors' liability at 
$100,000.00 while inside directors (i.e., corporate officers) can have a somewhat greater 
financial exposure, depending upon the level of their annual compensation from the 
corporation. 
12. For a discussion of some factors appearing in recently enacted statutes to be 
considered by directors in reaching corporate decisions, see supra notes 4 and 5 and accom­
panying text. 
13. The one notable exception which has come to the author's attention is Emhart 
Corporation, a Virginia corporation which adopted a charter amendment limiting direc­
tors' and officers' liability to $100,000.00. See EMHART CORPORATION, PROXY STATE­
MENT 46-50, C-l to C-5 (March 24, 1988). Otherwise, the various corporations of which 
the author is aware have sought charter amendments eliminating all monetary liability on 
the part of directors for breach of the duty of care. See, e.g., the proxy statements of the 
following publicly-held corporations: MDU RESOURCES GROUP, INC., PROXY STATE­
MENT at 1-3, A-I (March 6, 1987) (Delaware corp.); RJR NABISCO, PROXY STATEMENT 
12-16, A-I, B-1 (March 19, 1987) (Delaware corp.); HARTFORD NATIONAL CORPORA­
TION, PROXY STATEMENT 21-23,25 (April 15, 1987) (Delaware corp.); OKLAHOMA GAS 
AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT 15-25, A-I to A-4 (April 4, 1988) 
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II. THE ALI ApPROACH 
The Corporate Governance Project's proposed legislative solution 
differs from the three statutory approaches noted above in that the 
former is premised on the assumption that, "as a matter of public pol­
icy, some residual prospect of liability for due care violations should 
be retained." 14 Under the Corporate Governance Project approach set 
forth in its proposed section 7.17, the potential for financial liability 
could be reduced, but never eliminated. 
That section would measure a corporate official's maximum lia­
bility for a violation of the duty of care generally by the compensation 
received by the particular director or officer for serving the corpora­
tion during the year of the alleged violation. IS While certain more 
(Oklahoma corp.); FLEET/NORSfAR FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 23-27, 
B-1, C-l (April 7, 1988) (Rhode Island corp.); and SARA LEE CORPORATION, PROXY 
STATEMEIIo'T 15-17 (September 22, 1988) (Maryland corp.). (All of the above proxy state­
ments are on file at the office of the Western New England Law Review.) See also Note, The 
Limitation ofDirectors' Liability, supra note 1, at 446 n.187. 
While directors thus may be relieved of exposure to monetary liability, their perform­
ance of duties nevertheless may be influenced by other non-monetary factors, e.g. public 
disclosure requirements, their own perceptions (particularly in the case of outside directors) 
of their responsibilities, the accountability imposed on corporate managers by market 
mechanisms, and the like. See Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 34. 
14. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 28. 
15. The proposed section provides as follows: 

§ 7.17 Limitation on Damages for Certain Violations of the Duty of Care 

(a) If a failure by a director [§ 1.08] or an officer [§ 1.22] to meet the stan­
dard of conduct specified in § 4.01 did not 
(1) involve a knowing and culpable violation oflaw by the director or 
officer; or 
(2) enable the director or officer, or an associate [§ 1.02], to receive a 
benefit that was improper under Part V; or 
(3) show a conscious disregard for the duty of the director or officer to 
the corporation under circumstances in which the director or officer was 
aware that his conduct or omission created an unjustified risk of serious in­
jury to the corporation; or 
(4) constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that 
amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation, dam­
ages for the violation should be limited to an amount that is not dispropor­
tionate to the compensation received by the director or officer for serving the 
corporation during the year of the violation. 
(b) A limitation on damages complying with § 7.17(a) may be implemented 
by 
(1) an enabling statute that authorizes the inclusion of a limitation on 
damages in a corporation's certificate of incorporation; or 
(2) a provision in a certificate of incorporation that is adopted by a 
vote of disinterested shareholders [§ 1.11] after appropriate disclosure con­
cerning the provision. 
(c) Any limitation on damages set forth in the corporation's certificate of 
incorporation 
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egregious violations of the duty of care still would be subject to full 
financial liability for whatever damages proximately flowed from those 
violations,16 under section 7.17 as proposed, most violations would re­
quire no more than restitution by the corporate official of the compen­
sation earned for services to the corporation during the period in 
question. 17 
The position reflected in the Corporate Governance Project draft 
obviously is a middle ground between the traditional tort liability prin­
ciple of full liability for whatever damages proximately flow from a 
breach of duty and the contract principle that shareholders should be 
free to adopt whatever rules shall be applicable to their corporation 
(including even an elimination of all liability for breaches of duty). 
While accepting many of the considerations discussed in the following 
section which support limitation ofliability, 18 the draft commentary to 
section 7.17 borrows a concept from the Uniform Commercial Code to 
justify its rejection of a pure "freedom of contract" view which would 
legitimize the elimination of all liability. The commentary notes that 
section "7.17 is premised on the belief that there should be a minimum 
boundary in order that the risk of liability not be so low that the duty 
of care, as expressed in [section] 4.01, 'fail of its essential purpose,' "19 
i.e., to assure that corporate officials generally do act on behalf of the 
corporation in an appropriate manner. Section 7.17 thus implicitly 
rejects the argument that corporate officials should be subject to no 
financial liability because injunctive and other non-monetary remedies 
still available to shareholders will assure appropriate conduct by those 
officials.20 
(1) should require ratification by shareholder vote at periodic intervals 
and, in the case of a provision not expressly authorized by statute, be subject 
to repeal by shareholders at the annual meeting; and 
(2) should not reduce liability with respect to pending actions or losses 
incurred prior to its adoption. 
Corporate Governance Project, T.O. 7, supra note 6, at 25-26. 
While the ALI alternative measures a corporate official's maximum potential liability 
in a manner similar to the Virginia approach, it differs from the latter in that it mandates 
that minimum level ofliability. Under the Virginia approach, on the other hand, the share­
holders could vote to adopt a charter amendment providing for no monetary exposure. 
See supra note 10. 
16. See id. § 7. 17(a)(I)-(4). 
17. Corporate Governance Project, T.O. 7, supra note 6, at 38-39, 59-61. 
18. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. 
19. Corporate. Governance Project, T.O. 7, supra note 6,.at 31. See a/so id. at 37-38. 
20. Id. at 32-33. 
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III. PRINCIPAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING To THE NEED FOR 
LIMITATION ON LIABILITY 
How is it that the statutory approaches referenced at the outset 
have come to command so much interest and attention? A variety of 
factors have stirred the consciousness of corporate practitioners and 
legislators. These include difficulties faced by corporations in at­
tracting and retaining qualified directors, increased costs of obtaining 
appropriate insurance coverage for corporate officials, potential chil­
ling of entrepreneurial behavior, and the perceived need by individual 
states to keep their corporation laws competitive. with those in other 
jurisdictions. ' 
The factor cited most often in support of legislation limiting or 
eliminating monetary liability for directors has ,been the claim that 
corporations have found it increasingly difficult to attract and/or re­
tain qualified directors, due to the potential liability exposure such in­
dividuals otherwise face. 21 This claim actually can be broken down 
further into two related issues-first, that various'state court decisions 
interpreting directors' duty of care have increased the financial risks 
for individuals who serve as directors, particularly outside directors 
who have a very limited financial stake in the corporation; and second, 
that director and officer insurance coverage ("D & 0 insurance") has 
become ,prohibitively expensive and, in some cases, unavailable.22 
While there appears to be little hard data to indicate whether more 
corporate officials actually are being found liable for breach of the 
21. Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK. Sept. 8; 1986, at 56; Lerner & Burke, 
Protecting Directors in Tender Offer Contests and Leveraged BU)lO.uts, in DIRECTORS' AND 
OFFICERS' LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS 232 (Georgetown University Law 
Center compo 1987) (material on file at the office of the Western New England Law Review); 
TOUCHE Ross, ISSUES FACING U.S. CoRPORATE DIRECTORS 2, 5 (Dec. 1986) (over one­
third of 1,100 directors of publicly-held corporations surveyed indicated they had consid­
ered resignation due to increased liabilities to which exposed (on file at the office of the 
Western New England Law Review». One commentator identifies at least seventeen pub­
licly-held companies who specifically suffered director resignations. See Hanks, State Leg­
islative Responses, supra note I, at 24 n.6. See also Note, The Limitation of Directors' 
Liability, supra note I, at 413; 
22. Block, supra note I, at 131 n.5; Baum, supra note 21, at 56; Lewin, Director 
Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7,1986, at Dl, col. 2; Ipsen, The Crisis in Directors 
and Officers Insurance, 19 INST. INVESTORS 231 (Aug. 1985); Hilder, Risky Business: Lia­
bility Insurance is Difficult to Find Now for Directors. Officers, Wall St. J., July 10, 1985, at 
1; Foley, Insurance Against Director & Officer Liability, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' 
LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS 8-5 to 8-6 (Georgetown University Law Center 
compo 1987) (showing a decline in available coverage for D & 0 carriers from $347 million 
at January I, 1984, to $110 million at November I, 1986); Boundas, Negotiating the D&O 
Insurance Contract, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRI­
SIS 320-24 (Georgetown University Law Center compo 1987). 
10 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1 
duty of care via shareholder derivative actions than in the past, there is 
no question that the number of such lawsuits filed has increased dra­
. matically23 and that the average expenses involved in defending those 
lawsuits also have increased significantly.24 In addition, there clearly 
was a period from 1984 through 1987 during which the premium 
charges for D & 0 insurance escalated very rapidly.25 The net effect 
of these developments has been to generate myriad reports of either 
individuals choosing to resign as directors when adequate coverage 
could not be obtained or of corporations having difficulty recruiting 
qualified individuals willing to serve as directors.26 
The principal factor resulting in these consequences, arising in the 
recent era of large mergers and acquisitions, is the potential for dispro­
portionately large and somewhat unpredictable damages theoretically 
being attributable to directors' failure to observe due care. While the 
nature of directors' functions and responsibilities may not be much 
different from what shareholders expected of them fifteen or twenty 
years ago, the magnitude of the transactions on which directors must 
pass has changed dramatically. In the 1960s, for example, a share­
holder might have challenged a board of directors' decision not to un­
dertake a particular business opportunity which allegedly deprived the 
corporation of the opportunity to earn several hundred thousand dol­
lars a year.27 In the celebrated recent Smith v. Van Gorkom case,28 on 
23. Stone, Aetna Offers Added Protection to Corporate Directors, Hartford Courant, 
Feb. 24, 1988, at F-l (from 1970 to 1985, number of lawsuits seeking more than $1 million 
in damages from corporate officers and directors increased from 2 to in excess of 500). 
24. Id. 
25. In some instances, premium increases were as high as 1,000 %. Boundas, supra 
note 22, at 320. 
26. While the indemnification statutes in most states are intended to enable reim­
bursement to directors or officers of expenses associated with defending a lawsuit, those 
provisions sometimes will offer no help, either because the corporate official does not meet 
the standards of conduct set forth in the statute or because the corporation may be finan­
cially unable or unwilling (e.g., due to a change in corporate control) to provide the re­
quested indemnification. Olson, The D & 0 Insurance Gap: Strategies for Coping, Legal 
Times, Mar. 3, 1986, at 25, col. 1; Note, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses, supra note 
1, at 192-93. 
Similarly, D & 0 insurance coverage, even though authorized by most statutes, may 
be limited due to prohibitive cost, see supra note 25, or because of specific exclusions or 
deductibles provided in the particular D & 0 policy. See, e.g., Johnston & Gassman, Direc­
tors and Officers Liability Insurance-The Standard Insurance Contract, in DIRECTORS' 
AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS 292-97 (Georgetown University 
Law Center compo 1987). 
27. See, for example, the celebrated derivative action brought in the case ofShlensky 
V. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968), which probably involved a-damage 
claim of less than $1 million. While the plaintiff alleged that the failure to install lights (in 
order to enable night baseball games) resulted in the loss of substantial additional, revenues, 
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the other hand, the damages allegedly attributable to the directors' 
failure to sufficiently inquire regarding the acquisition proposed by 
their chief executive officer probably were in the vicinity of 
$65,000,000.00; the eventual settlement in that case was approxi­
mately $23,500,000.00.29 
A more fundamental argument put forward by proponents of one 
or more of the foregoing statutory alternatives is that the mere exist­
ence of potential liability for a director seriously discourages en­
trepreneurial decisiveness. To put it another way, faced with any 
possibility of personal financial liability as a result of shareholder liti­
gation, directors will be reluctant to authorize or engage in corporate 
transactions perceived to involve more than ordinary risk. 30 Classic 
economic doctrine holds that the greatest potential for reward usually 
the record indicated that the plaintiff was unable to show that the increased revenues would 
be sufficient to cure the losses tlien being suffered by the corporation. Id. at 182, 237 
N.E.2d at 781. 
28. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In that case, Van Gorkom, the 
chief executive officer of Trans Union Corporation, negotiated an agreement for the sale of 
the corporation via a merger to the Pritzker family at the price of $55.00 per share. The 
Delaware Supreme Court found that the Board of Directors did not reach an informed 
business judgment in approving that transaction. Specifically, the court found that the 
directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in initiating the 
transaction and establishing the per share purchase price; (2) did not obtain sufficient infor­
mation to enable them to reach an informed judgment on the fairness of the $55.00 per 
share price; and (3) failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation in approving the 
Pritzker merger proposal. Id. at 874-80. 
29. The case actually was remanded for a determination ofthe actual damages, to be 
measured by the difference between the fair market value of the Trans Union shares and the 
merger transaction price of $55.00 per share. Id. at 893. Assuming that the fair market 
value was at least $60.00 per share (a value within the range suggested by the chief financial 
officer's internal projections, id. at 867), the directors' aggregate liability would have ap­
proached $66 million, based upon the 13,357,758 shares outstanding at the time. Id. at 864 
n.3. 
The litigation subsequently was settled, apparently for a total of $23.5 million, $10 
million of which came from the D & 0 insurance carrier (that amount being the policy 
limit) and the balance from the acquirer. Block, supra note 1, at 136 n.28. 
30. The commentary to section 7.17 of the Corporate Governance Project analyzes 
this consideration in the following manner: 
[E]conomic logic suggests that a ceiling [on financial liability] would reduce 
the pressures on directors to act in an unduly risk-averse manner. Realistically, 
the risk of liability for due care violations tends to be one-sided: directors can be 
held liable for excessively risky acts or decisions, but not, as a practical matter, 
for excessively cautious ones. Given the frequently nominal investment of direc­
tors in their corporation's stock, a substantial risk of liability for negligence might 
lead risk-averse directors to opt for more hesitant policies than shareholders de­
sire (particularly to the extent that shareholders hold reasonably diversified port­
folios and so are substantially protected against any firm-specific risk) .... 
Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 31. 
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lies with those business decisions involving greater risk. 31 Thus, if cor­
porate officials are chilled from undertaking corporate transactions 
posing greater risk because of potential shareholder derivative action, 
the corporation and its shareholders, having foregone those business 
endeavors with the greatest profit potential, will be the losers in the 
long run. A related concern shared by many corporate practitioners is 
that the protection historically available to directors making decisions 
involving investment and business· risks under the so-called business 
judgment rule also has been eroded significantly.32. 
Finally, some corporate practitioners and state officials urge the 
adoption of one of these alternatives merely to keep their state compet­
itive with other state jurisdictions which already have done so. The 
concern expressed is that corporations presently domiciled in their 
states may elect to reincorporate in a state which has adopted more 
protective provisions for its domestic corporations.33 . 
How valid are all these concerns? It certainly is true that some 
corporations have found it somewhat more difficult to locate persons 
to serve as directors.34 However, whether this is solely or even princi­
pally attributable to the increased liability risks perceived to be associ­
ated with such service is open to question. There is some evidence that 
directors' changing perceptions of their functions and responsibilities 
have increased the time commitment that those persons feel is re­
quired, with the result that any given individual accepts fewer direc­
torship positions than in the past.35 Similarly, while D & 0 premiums 
have increased significantly, it is not clear what factors actually are 
most responsible for those increases-a greater frequency of share­
holder derivative actions, increased legal costs of defense, monetarily 
higher jUdgments, or poor actuarial judgments in earlier times.36 In 
31. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 42 (Foun~ 
dation Press, 3d ed. 1988); GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISI­
TIONS 85 (Foundation Press, 1986). 
32. See, e.g., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 
Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom 
After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985); Note, Smith v. Van Gorkom: A Narrow Inter­
pretation o/the Business Judgment Rule, 15 CAP. V.L. REV. 725 (1986). 
33. Testimony offered before the state legislatures invariably includes reference to 
the necessity to retain domestic corporations and the jobs for which tI;lOse corporations 
account. See, e.g., Woodward, How Much Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders, 
Wall St. J., May 5, 1988, at 32, col. 8; Murphy, Dread 0/Hostile Takeovers Leads to Com­
promise Legislation This Session, Hartford Courant, May 10, 1988 at Cl, col. 1. 
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
35. Melloan, A Good Director is Getting Harder to Find; Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1988, 'at 
39, col. 3. 
36. Boundas, supra note 22, at 320-24; Lee, supra note I, at 254 nn.73 & 74.. 
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any event, notwithstanding the recent escalation in premium costs, ad­
equate liability coverage generally appears to be available presently for 
most corporations and their officers and directors. 37 
The claim that entrepreneurial decision-making will be unduly 
discouraged assumes that the corporation law, both as written and as 
interpreted by the courts, leaves corporate officials without any mean­
ingful protection with respect to corporate decisions involving risk. 
That proposition, like the Player Queen in Hamlet, "doth protest too 
much."38 The generally prevailing statutory or case law standards for 
director action-that directors should act in good faith and in the best 
interests of the corporation with the care of a reasonable person in like 
circumstances39--do not themselves prohibit transactions which may 
involve both greater risk and greater reward potential.40 Moreover, 
the burden of proving that the directors' approval of a particular 
transaction was not in the best interests of the corporation falls on the 
challenging shareholder.41 Most importantly, the business judgment 
rule, in fact, remains intact, i.e., that directors' evaluations of the busi­
ness aspects of a particular transaction, including the potential risks 
and rewards, will not be second-guessed by a court, absent any impli­
cations of self-dealing or conflicts of interest on the part of the direc­
tors.42 None of the celebrated cases often referenced by practitioners 
actually threaten that basic doctrine. Smith v. Van Gorkom, for exam­
37. Boundas, supra note 22, at 320-24. 
38. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET 129 (Bell Pub. Co., Inc. 1958) (Lady Gertrude com­
menting on the comments of the Player Queen). 
39. The duty of care is spelled out in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act as . 
follows: 
[A] director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a 
member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a 
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984). 
40. The language referring to a director "in a like position" and "under similar cir­
cumstances" was intended to recognize that certain transactions may involve greater risks 
and that the nature and extent of the director's responsibilities thus may vary. Id., official 
comment at 222. See also The Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5, 15 (1976). 
41. Schwartz & Bauman, The Developing Business Judgment Rule, Georgetown Con­
ference, supra note 21, at 1, 20. See also Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 
1971); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF 
CoRPORATIONS § 234, at 625 (3d ed. 1983). Section 4.01(d) of the Corporate Governance 
Project expressly adopts that position: "A person challenging the conduct of a director or 
officer under this Section has the burden of proving a breach of duty of care . . . and the 
burden of proving that the breach was the legal cause of damage suffered by the corpora­
tion.". Tentative Draft 4 § 4.Ol(d) (1985). 
42. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 
264, 267 (Del. 1927). 
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pIe, is not a holding which authorizes a court to second-guess a consid­
ered decision by the board of directors; it rather is only a finding that 
the process for reviewing, questioning, and evaluating a proposed 
transaction must bring all the relevant information before the directors 
so that they can make an appropriate decision.43 While one thus can 
conclude that directors need not be chilled in their decision-making 
regarding transactions involving greater risks, that does not necessar­
ily remove the issue. To the extent that persons serving as directors 
perceive, even if incorrectly, that their decisions may be second­
guessed and liability imposed, they still may act in a risk-aversive 
manner. Fortunately, as will be noted shortly, that possible effect can 
be minimized, if not substantially eliminated, by providing a defined 
limit as to those directors' liability which, as a result of D & 0 insur­
ance and otherwise, they may be willing to bear. 
Leaving aside marginal tax revenues which possibly may be gen­
erated from a corporation which is domestically incorporated as op­
posed to one present only as a foreign corporation, it also is difficult to 
articulate any sound public policy reasons why states should compete 
to have the least restrictive or most relaxed corporate law require­
ments. In the first instance, it is a competition that cannot be finally 
or conclusively won. Thus, for example, even were the Connecticut or 
Massachusetts legislatures to decide to make their corporation laws 
more permissive, nothing precludes Delaware, Indiana, or some other 
state from enacting even more permissive legislation. Assuming that 
in such a "race to the bottom,"44 some state reaches the bottom, what 
will be the quality of the law? Most likely, it will be a law which 
affords no significant protections to either the shareholders, creditors, 
or employees of the corporation. Secondly, there actually are very few 
(albeit that those few are large and quite influential) corporations 
domiciled in any given state which seriously would consider 
reincorporation in another jurisdiction due to the then prevailing cor­
poration law statutes.45 
43. Smith, 488 A.2d at 889-93. 
44. For a discussion of some of the implications of a "race to the bottom," see Ha­
zen, supra note I, at 181-82; Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory ofDela­
ware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" 
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 913 (1982); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law 
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969). 
45. Since most corporate entities doing busi'ness in a particular state are subject to 
service of process, taxation, and corporate filing obligations whether or not domiciled in the 
state, they generally will find that the benefits of incorporating in a different jurisdiction do 
not outweigh the costs of doing so. A large corporation with operations and facilities in 
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Stripping away these layers leaves the common core argument 
traditionally advanced to legislators for both relaxed corporate law 
standards and more protective anti-takeover legislation-the need to 
preserve local jobs. While the preservation of local jobs obviously is 
an effective argument with which to obtain a legislator's attention, it 
simply is a false one-a red herring. Rarely have corporate law stan­
dards or requirements prevailing in a particular state had any impact 
upon plant or business openings or c1osings.46 
Indeed, of all the concerns discussed above, the one which has the 
most significant basis in fact is the contention that, with the sheer 
magnitUde of many corporate transactions effected in modern times, a 
corporation and its directors and officers can be subject to unpredict­
able and unreasonably disproportionate liability. In that circum­
stance, as the commentary to the Corporate Governance Project's 
section 7.17 states, "the traditional principle of law that persons are 
normally liable for· all damages that their actions cause collides with 
the policy considerations that support a ceiling on financialliabil­
ity."47 In attempting to set out a framework within which to fashion a 
revised statutory scheme, the Corporate Governance Project identifies 
the following policy reasons which have relevance to the concern over 
unpredictable and possibly excessive exposure to financial liability: 
First and most fundamentally, a ceiling is justified on grounds of 
fairness, because the potential liability in cases where the ceiling 
could apply would otherwise be excessive in relation to the nature of 
the defendant's culpability and the economic benefits expected from 
serving the corporation. Second, economic logic suggests that a 
ceiling would reduce the pressures on directors to act in an unduly 
risk-averse manner .... [Third], such a limitation may serve to re­
duce the cost of insurance (often bome by the corporation) because 
the likely exposure of the insurer is reduced. Although the threat of 
derivative litigation is only one of the determinants of the cost of 
0&0 insurance, which may be more affected by the threat of other 
liabilities (e.g., securities law liabilities, actions by a bankruptcy 
several states, on the other hand, may not be troubled by the incremental costs or require­
ments associated with incorporation in a different jurisdiction. The net result is that incor­
poration in a jurisdiction different from where the corporation has its facilities is likely to 
be considered only by the few large, publicly-held corporations in any given jurisdiction. 
46. The limited data available regarding hostile takeovers do not support a conclu­
sion that more often than not the acquiring company will close several of the acquired 
company's facilities or layoff substantial numbers of workers. See Tuerck, The Fallacy 0/ 
Laws That Stop Takeovers, Boston Globe, Feb. 23, 1988, at 48, col. 3; Woodward, supra 
note 33. 
47. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 30. 
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trustee, and· direct federal 'environmental and anti-discrimination 
actions), a limitation on due care liability at least contributes to cost 
reduction and also protects the defendant from the danger that his 
insurance coverage may be inadequate or that an exception to its 
coverage may be applicable to his case. . .. [Fourth], it is likely that 
the duty of care will be implemented by courts more evenly and 
appropriately when the potential penalties that may result are not 
perceived as Draconian.48 
Assuming that justification thus exists for pursuing modification 
of the rules imposing liability on directors,· we also need to consider 
what. other problems and COncerns may arise when we do so. 




Perhaps the most fundamental COncern posed is the question of 
the effect on shareholder remedies were directors freed from all finan­
cial accountability for breach of the duty of care. What protectionS or 
assurances, if any, will shareholders then have that directors will treat 
48. Id. at 31-32. It is interesting to note that the reasons urged by Emhart Corpora­
tion when it sought shareholder approval of a charter amendment limiting directors' and 
officers' liability to $100,000.00 are to a similar effect: 
The Board of Directors believes that the adoption of the Proposed Article is in 
the best interests of the stockholders as well as the Corporation. In recent years, 
there has been an increase in the number and amount of claims brought against 
directors and officers of corporations. At' the same time, the general availability 
of adequate directors' and officers' liability insurance coverage has been reduced 
and the cost of the available insurance has escalated dramatically. As a result, 
certain corporations have experienced significant difficulties in attracting· and re­
taining qualified persons to serve on their boards of directors. In addition, those 
who do serve may be inhibited by the unavailability of insurance from making 
business decisions that are in the best interests of the corporation. The Board of 
Directors has concluded that it is advisabie to provide directors and officers with 
broad protection under the Act (including limiting liability for monetary damages 
to $100,(00) in order to continue to attract and retain capable individuals to serve 
the Corporation. Further, even without" regard to insurance considerations, if the 
Proposed Article is adopted; the Board believes 'it will be able more freely to 
exercise its business judgment because the Proposeq Article will reduce the con­
cern as to potential litigation with respect to decisions that the Board must make 
affecting the future of the' Corporation. Finally, the cost of directors' and officers' 
liability insurance has increased substantially iii' recent years. The Corporation 
has historically carried such insurance although it has 'no legal obligation to do 
so. Although there can be no assurance thatthe adoption of.the Proposed Article 
will enable 'the Corporation more readily to secure directors' and officers' liability· . 
insurance at a lower cost, the Board of Directors believes that the Proposed Arti­
cle may have a favorable impact over the long term on the availability, cost, 
amount and scope of such insurance coverage .. '.. 
EMHART CORPORATION, PROXY STATEMENT 48-49 (March' 24, 1988).. 
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their interests as significant, let alone paramount? Several responses 
have been offered. Thus, for example, shareholders theoretically still 
can bring actions seeking to enjoin a particular corporate transaction 
as unfair or not in the corporation's best interests.49 Yet, how likely 
are such actions to succeed (let alone be attempted) in light of both the 
business judgment rule and the lack of any incentive among the "pri­
vate attorney generals" to pursue shareholder litigation?50 
Alternatively, unhappy shareholders presumably can initiate a 
proxy contest to replace directors with whom they are dissatisfied.51 
However, the disadvantages confronting would-be challengers, not the 
least of which is the staggering expense involved, coupled with the 
uncertainty of the recovery thereof, are many.52 Not to worry, re­
spond the defenders of liability limitations, unhappy shareholders can 
register their disapproval by exercising the Wall Street option, by sell­
ing their shares. 53 If there were some credible body of evidence sug­
gesting that such actions really have a significant influence on director 
and officer behavior, one might be willing to accept such a market 
approach. That evidence is lacking.54 Moreover, why should a share­
49. Since the Delaware statutory provision and others like it speak only of the elimi­
nation of monetary damages or financial liability, injunctive remedies remain available to 
shareholders troubled by an alleged directors' failure to use appropriate care in acting upon 
a particular transaction. For text of Delaware statute, see supra note 7. See also Veasey I, 
supra note 1, at 268 (duty of care has "vitality in remedial contexts other than personal 
monetary damages"); Hanks, supra note 1, at 25; and Comment, supra note 1, at 1062. 
50. See supra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text; see also Corporate Govern­
ance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 32-33. 
51. Under the Securities and Exchange Commission's proxy rules, an unhappy 
shareholder group can solicit proxies to elect their own slate of candidates to replace the 
incumbents with whom they are dissatisfied. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. 14a-6, 14a-7, 14a-9 
(1988). 
52. It is not unusual in proxy contests involving large publicly-held corporations for 
the expenses to involve millions of dollars. Thus, for example, in the recent proxy contest 
between Carl Icahn and the incumbent management of Texaco, the former spent between 
$5 and $7 million (and the latter presumably more). Wall St. J., June 20, 1988 at 3, col. 1. 
In a similar vein, the management of Gillette Co. reported that it set aside at least $9 
million in the first six months of 1988 in connection with the proxy contest and litigation in 
which it was engaged with The Coniston Partners. Boston Globe, July 23, 1988, at 12, col. 
4. In addition, absent a result other than full success, insurgents may be unable to obtain 
any reimbursement for the expenses incurred. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and 
Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). 
53. J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 60-61, 66-67 (1958). See also 
Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 779 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that, if all other remedies 
fail, unhappy shareholders "can sell or trade their stock in the offending corporation in 
favor of an enterprise more compatible with their own personal goals and values"), cerro 
denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982). 
54. While corporate managements clearly undertake considerable communication 
and solicitation with at least the large institutional investors who are current shareholders 
of a corporation (to obtain their support of either the incumbent directors or pending man­
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holder be forced to abandon his property interest in the corporation in 
order to influence those responsible for directing its affairs? 
In addition, even if one were to accept that directors should be 
held harmless from financial liability in some circumstances, why 
should not that decision, at a minimum, require an informed determi­
nation by shareholders to do so? If shareholders are to part with the 
right to hold directors accountable for the latters' failure to exercise 
due care, it should be by an informed and conscious decision-making 
process.55 The Indiana approach seems particularly repugnant be­
cause it achieves an elimination of potential director liability without 
the shareholders of such a domestic corporation having any say or 
voice.56 Similarly, to permit corporate practitioners to insert liability 
elimination provisions in a certificate of incorporation at the time of 
formation deprives the future shareholders of that entity from ever 
considering the choice. The only justifiable approach, whatever limi­
tation of director liability provisions is considered, is to require, first, 
that those provisions be adopted by affirmative vote of the outstanding 
shareholders after full and adequate disclosure and, second, that such 
limitations be periodically reexamined. 51 Approval by shareholders 
should be recognized only if the process by which the approval is 
sought allows for both meaningful articulation of the issues and oppor­
tunity for careful reflection. 
Another issue yet to be addressed in any of the analysis and dis­
cussion of the various statutory approaches concerns the appropriate­
ness of applying liability limitation provisions in the context of closely­
held corporations which, after all, constitute the overwhelming 
number of corporations domiciled in a particular state. 58 There are 
agement proposals), there is little evidence that management is materially influenced by the 
sale or disposition of shares by such a shareholder. 
55. The commentary to the Corporate Governance Project's T.D. 7 raises the issue 
of how meaningful is shareholder approval of charter amendments limiting or eliminating 
director liability: 
Given the typical shareholder's lack of awareness of the corporate charter, 
amendments that frustrate legitimate shareholder expectations may fairly be 
characterized as contracts of adhesion [i.e., lacking of any opportunity for mean­
ingful bargaining or consent]. . . . As a substitute for actual bargaining, 
§ 7.17(c)(I) specifies a "sunset" provision that requires periodic renewal by 
shareholders. 
Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 41-42. 
56. For text and discussion of Indiana statute, see supra note 9 and accompanying 
text. 
57. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 41-43. 
58. There are in excess of 3,000,000 corporations in the United States filing corporate 
tax returns. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 1987 at 503, Table 852. Yet only 12,000 to 13,000 of those are publicly traded, 
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three characteristics of a closely-held corporation which should cause 
us to consider their situation specially. In the first instance, there is a 
much greater likelihood that there will be substantial identity between 
the directors and shareholders of the corporation, i.e., the principal 
shareholders also will serve as directors~S9 The separate functions and 
responsibilities usually exercised by persons in those different capaci­
ties may well become blurred and indistinguishable. Actions ordina­
rily performed by the directors may be undertaken by the shareholders 
or they simply may be undertaken without regard as to the capacity in 
which the individuals intended to act. 60 
The basic relationship between the participants in a closely-held 
corporation also is likely to be different from the relationship between 
directors and shareholders of a large enterprise. In the former, the 
relationship may be both perceived and conducted more in the nature 
of a partnership, with higher expectations and trust regarding the con­
duct of one another.61 In the latter, there may well be a separation of 
ownership and control. Moreover, should the relationship turn out 
less favorably than anticipated, e.g., a particular shareholder's expec­
tations simply are not met, there is far less opportunity for the un­
happy shareholder in the closely-held corporation to liquidate his 
holdings and seek an alternative investment.62 Means for resale of the 
shareholder's interest may be severely limited; there is no comparable 
Wall Street option available as is the case at least for larger corpora­
tions whose shares are publicly traded.63 
V. A MORE BALANCED ApPROACH 
The discussion in Part III above certainly suggests that some ac­
tion needs to be taken to address the threat of staggering recoveries 
against directors of publicly-held companies for breach of the duty of 
care. On the other hand, the immediately preceding section identifies , 
i.e., with more than 500 shareholders of record and securities registered under § 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIRECTORY OF 
COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SECURITIES AND Ex­
CHANGE COMMISSIONER (1986). 
59. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16,203 N.E.2d 577 (1965); Donahue v. Rodd 
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). 
60. Thus, for example, § 8.0l(c) ofthe Revised Model Business Corp. Act authorizes 
a corporation to operate without a board of directors, i.e., by shareholder action. REVISED 
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(c) (1984). 
61. See, e.g., Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586-87, 328 N.E.2d at 512; Kruger v. Gerth, 16 
N.Y.2d 802, 805, 210 N.E.2d 355, 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d I, 3 (1965) (Desmond, c.J., 
dissenting). 
62. See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 591-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. 
63. Id. 
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a variety of problems which may be raised by pursuing the statutory 
alternatives offered to date in response to that threat. 
The approach advocated by the Corporate Governance Project, 
and the one being urged by this author for consideration by state legis­
lators, is based upon a belief that a more reasonable balance between 
the concerns of directors and the rights of shareholders can be 
achieved, as opposed to simply insulating directors from all liability 
for breach of duty of care. That balance can be achieved by providing 
a statutory cap on liability for corporate officials reasonably related to 
the economic benefits received by those persons from the corporation 
they serve. Were that approach to be followed, the state corporation 
law would provide that the maximum liability which an officer or di­
rector would have for breach of the duty of care would be measured by 
the amount of compensation or fees that person had received from the 
corporation over a specified period of time.64 
Such an approach would offer shareholders a process by which to 
hold corporate officials accountable when the latters' acts, by virtue of 
their failure to exercise due care, had caused or allowed injury to the 
corporation to result. Yet, at the same time, the ceiling limitation 
would protect those corporate officials from the horrendously dispro­
portionate exposure to liability which presently exists. With specific 
estimates of the maximum liability to which officers and directors 
would be exposed then possible, D & 0 coverage should be more rea­
sonably affordable.6s 
The specific amount of any such cap obviously is somewhat arbi­
trary because, in any given instance, the amount of the ceiling will 
have no direct relationship to the harm suffered by the corporation. 66 
From the standpoint of restoring a corporation to the position it 
64. For a description of how § 7.17 of the Corporate Governance Project would op­
erate, see supra note 15 and accompanying text. The author of Note, The Limitation of 
Directors'Liability, supra note 1, proposes a similar approach, setting a floor of $100,000.00 
for outside directors and the annual compensation received in their officer capacity for 
inside directors. Id. at 449-51. 
65. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 31-32. 
66. To the extent that the mere existence of a cap in fact influences directors' con­
duct in a manner which promotes accountability, the arbitrariness of any specific cap 
amount is less relevant. Measuring the amount of such a cap by reference to the amount of 
compensation received by the corporate official over an identified period actually is not all 
that arbitrary. With a restitution-based measure of damages, the party who has acted 
wrongfully forfeits his or her rights to compensation and whatever profits may have been 
obtained. The Corporate Governance Project justifies this as consistent with general 
agency law cases and principles. Id. at 39. Traditional tort liability concepts, on the other 
. hand, would suggest awarding a victorious corporation in a derivative action damages for 
the full extent of injuries suffered. Id. at 30. 
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would have been in had a particular transaction not been pursued, this 
remedy generally will be inadequate. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
the existence of some residual liability can have an impact in monitor­
ing and influencing directors' and officers' conduct, a liability cap 
would appear worth pursuing. It has been surprising that so few cor­
porate law practitioners have urged this alternative approach in the 
legislative debates that have occurred to date. Perhaps this is attribu­
table to the fact that most practitioners who represent corporations 
identify their client as the incumbent management or the board of di­
rectors rather than the ultimate owners, the shareholders.67 
Some commentators suggest that a statutory ceiling approach 
may be constitutionally infirm.68 Various liability caps enacted by 
state legislatures in other contexts have been challenged on the ground 
that those limitations violate, among other constitutional provisions, 
the seventh amendment to the Constitution and the comparable state 
constitutional protections regarding the basic right to a jury trial.69 
This writer believes, however, that a liability cap in the area of officers' 
and directors' liability can withstand a constitutional challenge if ap­
propriately enacted. 
While several constitutional law issues have been raised with re­
spect to statutory limitation of damages in a variety of areas, the prin­
cipal challenge has been the right to a jury trial on the subject of 
damages. The principal grouping of cases which have questioned the 
constitutionality of ceilings on liability has dealt with various state leg­
islative efforts to impose caps on malpractice liability or non-economic 
damages with respect to recognized common law causes of action.70 
Among the more recent decisions invalidating a statutory cap on med­
ical malpractice awards is that in Boyd v. Bulala,71 where Federal Dis­
trict Judge Michael found that the $750,000.00 cap enacted by the 
Virginia legislature violated the plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury 
67. It was instructive to this writer to hear one of the principal speakers, a highly 
regarded corporate practitioner, at the Corporation Law Section's special program during 
the Connecticut Bar Association's 1987 Annual Meeting, claim that corporate lawyers had 
an obligation to their clients, the members of a corporation's board of directors, to support 
the legislative approach offering maximum exculpation from liability, i.e., the Indiana ap­
proach. Nothing in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however, mandates such a 
conclusion. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer, §§ 1.7, 1.13 (1983). 
68. See, e.g., Hanks, supra note I, at 30; Hazen, supra note I, at 173. 
69. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986); Jones v. State Bd. of 
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); White V. 
State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 
825 (1980). 
70. For case citations, see supra note 69. 
71. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986). 
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trial under both the United States and Virginia constitutions. That 
case is of special interest because of its potential bearing on the statu­
tory cap provision enacted in Virginia with respect to the limitation of 
directors' liability for breach of the duty of care.72 
The plaintiff actually challenged the constitutionality of the mal­
practice award cap on three independent constitutional law grounds­
as a denial of equal protection, as violative of the plaintiff's due pro­
cess rights, and as violative of the plaintiff's constitutional right to a 
trial by juryJ3 While Judge Michael held that the statutory cap did 
not violate the equal protection and due process clauses,74 he did find 
that the cap violated the plaintiff's seventh amendment right to a jury 
trial since, as drafted, the malpractice damages cap "infringes strongly 
on the fact-finding function of the jury in assessing appropriate dam­
ages."7S A key inquiry thus was whether the determination of dam­
ages should be classified as a fundamental jury function.76 Judge 
Michael concluded that the assessment of the full measure of dan:tages 
always had been regarded as within the scope of the jury's basic 
functions. 77 
At first blush, all of Judge Michael's reasoning in that case would 
appear to be equally applicable both to the statutory cap reflected in 
the Virginia approach and to a ceiling of the type proposed by section 
7.17 of the ALI Corporate Governance Project. A shareholder's right 
to sue for a corporate official's breach of the duty of care has long been 
recognized.78 Although the shareholders' derivative action has been 
categorized as a combination of actions at law and equity, the 
Supreme Court clearly held in Ross v. Bernhard 79 that plaintiffs in 
such an action are entitled to the right to a jury trial. 80 
72. For text and discussion of the Virginia statute, see supra notes 10 and 11 and 
accompanying text. 
73. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 785. 
74. Id. at 787-88. 
75. Id. at 788-89. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 789. 
78. Many corporation statutes, in fact, are silent on both the duty of care which a 
director must exercise and a shareholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation to 
enforce such a duty. See, e.g., Conn. Stock Corporation Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 33-282 to 418 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988). 
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 eliminating the 
distinctions between actions at law and equity, the corporation's right to recover against 
corporate officials was recognized at law, but a shareholder's right to bring such an action 
on behalf of the corporation was recognized only in equity. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 u.S. 
531, 536-37 (1970). 
79. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
80. Id. at 536. 
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At least two responses can be offered why a statutory limitation 
in the case of directors' liability should be constitutionally permissible, 
notwithstanding the Boyd v. Bulala analysis. The Reporter responsi­
ble for drafting section 7.17 of the Corporate Governance Project cites 
a variety of additional state court holdings81 to support his view that 
"a reasonable limitation on the liability of directors and officers should 
encounter no serious constitutional obstacle."82 The limitation pro­
posed in section 7.17 apparently is viewed as a reasonable, rather than 
an arbitrary, limitation, both because it is directly related to the eco­
nomic benefits received by whomever may be the particular defendants 
and because, in shareholder derivative actions, individual shareholders 
are not seeking direct recovery for serious personal injuries or dam­
ages, but rather on behalf of the corporation as an entity. 83 
While these arguments may be sufficient to dispose of any consti­
tutional law challenge, this author would respond to any prospective 
challenge by an alternative means-first, by requiring that any statu­
tory cap provision be approved by the requisite vote of the sharehold­
ers of that corporation, and, second, by expressly providing in the 
amendment or the related disclosures furnished to shareholders that 
such approval represents a decision by the shareholders to waive their 
right to a jury trial on the full measure of damages otherwise available 
in the absence of a cap. 
The nature of the derivative action which has been the focal point 
for all the discussion is one dependent totally upon the shareholder 
status of the persons involved. In other words, no one has a right to 
bring any action on the corporation's behalf against the officers or di­
rectors of the corporation except by having met certain shareholder 
qualifications.84 
Furthermore, the corporation law statutes long have provided for 
81. Included are Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1,271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Johnson v. 
St. Vincent Hosp. Inc., 273 Ind. 374,404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Fein v. Permanente Medical 
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137,695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985). Corporate Governance 
Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 62. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Pioneer Federal Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Reeder, 474 So. 2d 
783 (Fla. 1985); Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981); and 
State ex reI. Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). 
82. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 62. 
83. As to any recovery in a derivative action being for the benefit only of the corpora­
tion, see Ross, 396 U.S. at 538; Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 
.522 (1947). 
84. Thus, for example, the Revised Model Business Corporations Act requires that a 
person bringing a derivative action: (1) be a shareholder at the time of transaction com­
plained of; and (2) make a demand upon the Board of Directors to obtain action (or allege 
sufficient facts to state why such demand is excused). See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. 
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shareholder voting on various corporate matters by a certain percent­
age of the outstanding shares.8s Typically, so long as the requisite per­
centage of affirmative votes-either a majority or two-thirds of the 
voting power represented-is obtained, all shareholders thereafter are 
bound by that vote. 86 There is nothing preposterous or inconsistent in 
applying that well-known concept to a shareholder vote to approve a 
statutory ceiling on the liability of corporate officials. Moreover, if 
shareholders have the authority to vote to eliminate officer and direc­
tor liability altogether, as contemplated, for example, under both the 
Delaware and Virginia approaches, how can they not also approve a 
statutory ceiling on liability, a lesser reduction of their otherwise rec­
ognized right?87 
Most decisions which have involved a waiver of constitutional 
rights relate to criminal or other matters involving individual defend­
ants.88 Nevertheless, the teaching of those cases is that such a waiver 
is possible, particularly if the waiver is an informed one.89 An amend­
ment to a publicly-held corporation's certificate of incorporation limit­
ing the amount of damages recoverable in an action for breach of duty 
of care that has to be submitted to shareholders for action will trigger 
the production of a proxy statement describing the consequences of 
adoption or rejection of the amendment.90 Shareholder approval thus 
cannot be given without adequate information having been disclosed 
in advance of the shareholder vote. A similar requirement could be 
ACT § 1.40 (1984). Other states add additional requirements, e.g., that the shareholder put 
up security for expenses. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 621 (McKinney 1986). 
85. See, e.g., the following statutory material regarding merger and sale of assets 
transactions: REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 11.03, 12.01 (1984); DEL. CoDE 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271 (1983 & Supp. 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B §§ 15, 78 (Law 
Co-op 1979 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-366, 33-372 (West 1987). 
86. The typical effect given to shareholder action which obtains the requisite vote is 
as expressed in Rev. Model Business Corp. Act § 11.05, which provides as follows: 
(a) After a plan of merger ... is approved by the shareholders ... the 
surviving or acquiring corporation shall deliver to the secretary of state for filing 
articles of merger . . .. 
(b) Unless a delayed effective date is specified, a merger ... takes effect 
when the articles of merger ... are filed. 
REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.05 (1984). 
81. At least one judge has disagreed with the concept that the power to deal exhaus­
tively with the whole inherently includes the power to deal with a lesser portion thereof. 
See Judge Michael's opinion in Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781,789-90 (W.D. Va. 1986). 
88. See, e.g., the lengthy annotation of cases in Annotations, Withdrawal or Disre­
gard of Waiver of Jury Trial in Civil Action, 64 A.L.R.2d 506 (1959). 
89. Id. 
90. See Item 19 of Regulation 14A (calling for mandatory disclosure of "the reasons 
for and the general effect of" any charter or by-law amendment being submitted for share­
holder action.) 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-101 (Schedule 14A, Item 19) (1988). 
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included in the applicable state corporation statutes with respect to 
smaller closely-held corporations not subject to the federal proxy 
rules.91 In short, it should be possible to structure a required share­
holder approval which would avoid any basis for challenge on consti­
tutional law grounds .. 
CONCLUSION 
The support urged in this commentary for the Corporate Govern­
ance Project's "middle ground" response is rooted in a belief that it is 
possible both to afford corporate officials substantial relief from other­
wise unreasonable exposure to financial liability and, at the same time, 
preserve some meaningful accountability for the actions of corporate 
officials to the shareholders. As noted earlier, a ceiling related to the 
economic benefits realized by the corporate official will achieve all the 
desired objectives involved in limiting liability-avoiding dispropor­
tionate, excessive or Draconian damages, reducing pressures on corpo­
rate officials to act in an unduly risk-averse manner, and reducing the 
costs of D & 0 insurance coverage for corporate officials-while at the 
same time retaining some accountability on the part of corporate offi­
cials through the prospect of a minimal residual liability for due care 
violations. While the deterrent effect of derivative litigation unques­
tionably will be reduced with a statutory limitation on due care liabil­
ity, the potential threat of such litigation nevertheless should continue 
to exert an influence in pronioting prudent actions by corporate offi­
cials. That residual potential, coupled with the impact of other devel­
opments such as the presence on a board of directors of a majority of 
independent directors, securities disclosure requirements, and the mar­
ket discipline imposed by the possibility of hostile takeover bids, 
should assure an adequate minimum level of corporate accountability. 
The total elimination of financial liability contemplated by the In­
diana approach (and, as a practical matter, the other statutory ap­
91. Thus, for example, a typical "books and records" provision of a corporation stat­
ute (see, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-307 (West 1987» could be amended 
by adding something like the following: 
Each corporation, other than a corporation subject to Section 14 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, seeking shareholder approval of an amend­
ment to its certificate of corporation with respect to the limitation of liability of 
directors, corporate officers or agents for breach of duty to the corporation, shall 
furnish to the applicable shareholders of record a brief statement describing the 
reason for and general effect of the proposed amendment. 
In any given instance, the specific disclosures made by the corporation describing the 
"general effect" of the proposed cap would include an express statement that approval by 
shareholders represents a decision to waive rights to a jury trial as to damages. 
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proaches) swings the pendulum further than necessary to afford 
corporate officials the basic protection they desire and need. In the 
absence of any residual financial liability exposure, the duty of care 
provisions of state corporation law would fail to have any meaningful 
significance or function. With a remedy for due care violations that 
measures the maximum exposure by the economic benefits received by 
the delinquent corporate officials, the applicable duty of care standards 
of the state corporation law statutes will retain both some credibility 
and operative deterrent impact. 
The state legislatures which either have acted or are considering 
legislation to absolve directors of all financial exposure-which in­
clude Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York in the Northeast­
have been persuaded to adopt too extreme a response. It is time for 
those states to reexamine the issues involved more closely and to ad­
dress the concerns of both corporate officials and shareholders in a 
fairer and more balanced manner. 
